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Abstract: In pursuit of economic growth and development, countries have tried to strike a balance between competition 
and industrial policies across time. This paper will review the empirical evidence on industrial concentration and its 
economic correlates (notably firms’ performance as measured by profitability, factor productivity and innovation). It will 
also analyze how the introduction of competition policies and laws in South Korea, China, India, Indonesia and the 
Philippines affected industrial concentration. It will examine at what point in their industrialization and economic 
development these economies implemented these laws and policies. The empirical literature suggests that industrial 
concentration could exhibit an inverted-U-shaped relationship as far as its link to certain economic indicators of success, 
such as productivity and innovation. This suggests a role for recalibrating policies to adjust the balance between 
industrial concentration and competition, so that the over-all outcomes are net welfare enhancing. Indeed, country policy 
experiences reviewed here appear to demonstrate this recalibration, notably following privatization and liberalization 
policies. 
Keywords: Industrial policy, competition, import substitution, concentration, productivity. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades, numerous developing 
countries adopted policy reforms to jumpstart economic 
growth and development, either through import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) or export-led 
strategies (often both and in this order). During this 
time, it was not uncommon to see state enterprises or 
national champions grown and nurtured with direct or 
implicit public subsidies and other support. The 
objective was to enable these enterprises to reach 
scale economies to compete (or at least reach 
economic viability), first in domestic markets and later 
in international markets. This first wave of industrial 
policies inevitably contributed to industrial 
concentration—the expansion and dominance of one or 
a few firms in certain industries—with ambiguous net 
economic implications. 
Industrial concentration could be associated with 
relatively more successful and efficient firms rising to 
the top and reaching scale (Demsetz, 1973, 1974), and 
large firms with more secure market share could be 
more likely to innovate since they would better capture 
the proceeds (Schumpeter, 1942; 1947). From this 
vantage point, concentration could contribute to more 
innovation, productivity and robust growth prospects for 
the country. On the other hand, industrial concentration 
could also (though not necessarily) result in the abuse 
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of market power, weaken the motivation for innovation 
(due to the lack of competition from rivals), discourage 
new entrants and perpetuate monopoly profits (e.g., 
Scherer, 1980; Baumol, 1982). Further, larger firms 
may not necessarily be more innovative than smaller 
ones, and the lack of competition could also deter 
innovation and expansion after a certain scale is 
reached. These conditions combined with entry barriers 
for new firms could eventually be net welfare reducing 
despite any benefits from initial industrial scale-up.  
In a second wave of policy reforms, countries later 
adopted market-oriented principles and turned to 
privatization of state owned enterprises and 
liberalization of formerly protected sectors. These 
second generation reforms meld and temper the initial 
industrialization strategies with competition policies and 
laws that are intended to encourage new (domestic and 
foreign) entrants in industries in order to foster 
competition. Transitioning into this second wave of 
reforms entails a paradigm shift in economic policy-
making and business practices. This involves not only 
changing the status quo and challenging well-
entrenched interests, but also developing the technical 
capacity to effectively implement and calibrate these 
reforms, particularly, competition laws. Under these 
conditions, managing competition is essentially about 
striking a balance between industrial concentration and 
market competition. 
This paper will briefly review the empirical evidence 
on industrial concentration and its economic correlates 
(notably firms’ performance as measured by 
profitability, factor productivity and innovation). It will 
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then examine the factors and influences that prompted 
the adoption of competition policies and laws in 
selected countries that transitioned from centrally-
planned economies to a more market-oriented 
framework. It will examine at what point in their 
industrialization and economic development these 
economies implemented these laws and policies. 
Indeed, empirical evidence across countries suggests 
that industrial concentration has various economic 
implications – and these implications depend on what 
stage of development the country is in. 
While it is difficult to formulate precise comparisons 
across these countries, the analysis herein 
nevertheless highlights some similarities in how 
countries seek to achieve a pragmatic balance 
between industrial and competition policies. There is 
evidence that industrial concentration could exhibit an 
inverted-U-shaped relationship as far as its link to 
certain economic indicators of success. In terms of 
productivity and innovation for example, initial 
increases in industrial concentration could strengthen a 
positive relationship. However, once a certain point is 
reached, the link may turn negative (i.e., concentration 
may begin to deter innovation and stifle productivity). 
This suggests a role for recalibrating policies to adjust 
the balance between industrial concentration and 
competition, so that the over-all outcomes are net 
welfare enhancing. Indeed, country policy experiences 
reviewed here appear to demonstrate this attempt at 
recalibration, notably following privatization and 
liberalization policies.  
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION 
The empirical evidence on the degree of 
competition and its economic correlates often 
considers measures of industrial concentration as a 
proxy indicator for competition. The X-firm 
concentration ratio in each industry is a widely used 
measure in this body of literature.
1
 While this measure 
is not without its limitations (i.e., industrial 
concentration is thought to be a necessary though 
insufficient condition for market power), it has become 
accepted as an initial proxy which nevertheless 
requires further probing.
2
 The now extensive empirical 
                                            
1
Most studies use a 4-firm concentration ratio. For a discussion of alternative 
firm concentration ratios, see Kilpatrick (1967). 
2
For further elaboration on industrial concentration and the different possible 
measures, see for example Adelman (1951), Kwoka (1981) and Curry and 
George (1983). 
literature on industrial concentration and its economic 
correlates paints a mixed picture. 
2.1. Concentration, Innovation and Productivity 
As regards the link between concentration and 
innovation, the literature contains an extensive 
discussion of the pros and cons of “big firm capitalism” 
(see for instance Baumol, Litan and Schramm, 2007). 
Vossen (1999), for example, discussed the possible 
paradoxical implications of industrial concentration on 
research and development (R&D) spending and 
innovation outputs. A more concentrated market is 
expected to produce higher price-cost margins for its 
firms, in turn providing incentives for innovation, 
notably if the protection period for the innovator is 
secured (e.g., through a patent period of sufficient 
length). On the other hand, an unsecured protection 
period combined with fewer and larger competitors 
could imply that these larger firms are more capable of 
circumventing patent protection measures. The link 
between an industrial structure characterized by a few 
large firms and innovation is therefore an empirical 
question. Examining data from national innovation 
surveys in 1988 and 1992 in the Netherlands’ 
manufacturing sector, Vossen found evidence that the 
positive link of industrial concentration and R&D 
spending is at least as strong for small firms when 
compared to larger firms within the same industry, 
suggesting that market power does not seem 
necessary for innovative effort. Nevertheless, R&D 
spending translates to stronger innovative output in 
less concentrated industries, even as R&D spending 
tends to be higher with increased industrial 
concentration. 
In terms of industrial concentration and firm 
performance (e.g., measured by factor productivity and 
profitability), a possible inverted-U-shaped relationship 
could occur (Scherer, 1980). Initially, monopoly profits 
accompanying increased industrial concentration could 
free resources to be channelled into innovation and 
enhanced productivity. However, at higher levels of 
concentration the relationship could turn negative, as 
imperfect competition also weakens the incentives to 
innovate in order to remain competitive. Empirical 
analysis of this topic focused on the US banking 
industry suggests that concentration is not necessarily 
random, rather it is the outcome of more efficient firms 
expanding and dominating their respective industries. 
Profitability is therefore not necessarily due to industrial 
concentration per se (Smirlock, 1985). Separate 
empirical analysis of the US manufacturing industry 
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shows that firm group price-cost margins tend to be 
larger where firm group productivity is above the 
industry average (Martin, 1988).  
Evidence on the manufacturing sectors of the 
United States (Gopinath, Pick and Li, 2004) and India 
(Goldar, 1986) also further suggest a positive link 
between industrial concentration and productivity. Both 
studies also provide evidence that better firm 
performance may not necessarily be due to increased 
concentration; rather the latter may simply be proxying 
for other factors like the presence of scale economies. 
The study by Gopinath, Pick and Li (2004) provided 
additional evidence in support of the inverted-U-shaped 
relationship between industrial concentration and 
productivity. They find that a 1 percent growth in 
industrial concentration is associated with an initial 0.14 
percent increase in total factor productivity growth. 
However, this empirical relationship appeared to 
decline—and later turn negative—as industrial 
concentration increased. This suggests a need to 
recalibrate policies at certain stages of industrialization. 
The process of market-oriented reforms does not 
appear to be linear, and it depends critically on the 
country’s stage of development as well as broader 
pressures on the reform process.
3
 
2.2. Concentration and Economic Openness 
Industrial concentration and economic openness 
could also be ambiguously linked. On the one hand, 
the penetration of imported products could exert a 
disciplining effect on the profitability of highly 
concentrated sectors. The “import-discipline” 
hypothesis contends that the threat of entry by foreign 
competitors motivates domestic firms to use pricing 
strategies that forestall entry, approximating pricing 
under more competitive conditions.
4
 On the other hand, 
more competitive export-oriented firms could thrive in a 
much more liberalized environment. They could begin 
to scale-up their operations to take advantage of far 
larger international markets and production networks. 
Even firms focused primarily on the domestic market 
could benefit perhaps from foreign investments and 
access to international capital, alleviating any domestic 
capital challenges that once constrained them. 
                                            
3
The interested reader may wish to refer to Medalla (2002) for a review of the 
state of competition and issues behind competition policy reforms vis-à-vis 
selected industries in the Philippines. In addition, Kagami and Tsuji (2003) 
contain analyses of different industrial agglomeration experiences across 
Japan (e.g., automobile, iron, information technology), Vietnam, South Korea, 
China, Italy and the United States. 
4
See the discussion on potential entry of importers (Geroski and Jacquemin, 
1981) and multinational companies (Sleuwagen, 1983). 
As regards empirical evidence, an analysis of the 
Chilean manufacturing industry shows that economic 
openness in trade contributed to an increase in its 
industrial concentration, an outcome consistent with 
theories suggesting the disappearance of small and 
inefficient firms that could not compete, and the 
expansion of more efficient firms that sought to exploit 
scale economies (De Melo and Urata, 1986). On the 
other hand, evidence on the Philippines suggests that 
the absence of openness could also contribute to an 
oligopolistic industrial structure. De Dios (1985) 
examined data on the Philippine manufacturing 
industry and the effective rate of protection, and found 
that the latter contributed to seller concentration. This 
study also found evidence that tariffs not only 
contribute to industrial concentration, but it also fosters 
more concentrated FDI inflows to the extent that these 
are primarily motivated by tariff-jumping. This finding 
was consistent with the hypothesis that the 
concentration of foreign investments could be due in 
part to their attraction to monopolistic returns in heavily 
concentrated industries. 
In addition, Bird (1999) analyzed industrial 
concentration patterns in Indonesia during the period 
from 1975-1993 and found evidence that average 
industrial concentration is lower in export-competing 
(compared to import-competing) industries both before 
and after the trade policy reforms in the 1980s. One 
possible explanation is that trade openness enabled 
industries to sustain a larger number of firms, many of 
which were able to reach scale partly due to the much 
larger international export markets. Correcting for the 
influence of international trade also leads to much 
lower industrial concentration estimates for Indonesia, 
suggesting that comparisons of concentration 
indicators should be appropriately “deflated” for the 
influence of trade. 
More concentrated industries may also offer 
conditions that are much more conducive to successful 
protectionist lobbying (e.g., Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971). Chari and Gupta (2007) examine whether this 
holds true in India, using an extensive firm-level data 
covering balance sheet and ownership information on 
over 2,100 firms accounting for over 70 percent of 
Indian industrial output. These authors examined 
whether pre-liberalization characteristics such as 
industry structure and the ownership of incumbent firms 
are linked to government policies on selective 
liberalization. Their findings suggest that firms in 
concentrated industries and state-owned enterprises 
tend to be more effective in blocking foreign entry 
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(compared to, respectively, firms in non-concentrated 
industries and similarly placed private, non-state firms). 
Consistent with theory, they also find evidence that 
more profitable state owned firms tend to be much 
more effective in blocking foreign competitors from 
entering (compared to less profitable state firms). 
3. INSIGHTS FROM ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 
EXPERIENCES 
A review of industrial and competition policy 
trajectories of South Korea, China, India, Indonesia and 
the Philippines shows that these countries seem to be 
approximating a general pattern of initial strong 
industrial support strategies, followed by the phased 
introduction of competition policies and laws. 
Competition policy is almost always gradually 
introduced, and it often follows after a certain critical 
mass of industrial concentration is reached. 
3.1. Republic of Korea 
Beginning in the 1960s, the South Korean 
government adopted policies to nurture “national 
champions” by promoting the growth of selected labor-
intensive and export-oriented industries, and later 
moving on to heavy industries, through tax and 
financial incentives and tight import controls. Such 
industrial policy ushered in the growth of a few big 
family-owned industrial conglomerates, the chaebols. 
High entry and exit barriers created in favor of these 
chaebols further ensconced these few conglomerates 
across Korean industries (Chang and Jung, 2002). 
Korea’s export-oriented strategy and subsequent 
investments in heavy industries helped usher rapid 
economic growth. Real GDP per capita growth 
averaged about 5.53% (computed average from 1961-
1980) during the 1961-1980 period (World 
Development Indicators Online). Real GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 USD) increased from USD 1,109.86 in 
1960 to about USD 3,221.45 by 1980.
5
 Nevertheless, 
chaebols prices in the domestic market tended to be 
higher than world prices, generating public clamor to 
rein in their perceived abuse of market power. On the 
other hand, strong GDP growth provided a strong 
argument for chaebols to oppose the adoption of 
competition law, despite efforts to pass this by 
consumer groups (Chang and Jung, 2002). The 
economic crisis in 1980 coupled with the ouster of 
                                            
5
Data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online. 
President Park gave the new regime the impetus to 
institute significant reforms by transitioning from a 
government-led economy to a market economy (Chang 
and Jung, 2002). Together with initiating the process of 
liberalization and deregulation of industries, the South 
Korean government also adopted the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in 1980. 
Through the MRFTA, the Fair Trade Office (FTO) 
under the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was 
established (Jung and Chan, 2006). 
During the period 1981-1986 or the first phase of 
the development of competition promotion and 
enforcement, the FTO engaged mostly in activities 
geared towards increasing awareness of the MRFTA. 
The FTO started enforcement work from 1986, and its 
functions were later transferred to the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (KFTC), an independent organization 
under the EPB (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2011). 
In 1990, the Secretariat and regional offices in 
Busan, Gwangju and Daejeoun were established, 
thereby integrating the jurisdictions of fair trade 
enforcement (Korea Fair Trade Commission 2011). 
After 1986, KFTC enforcement was more focused on 
regulating chaebol activities, including prohibiting the 
establishment of holding companies, as well as cross-
shareholding between affiliates of large business 
groups, and providing a cap to the total equity 
investment. During the period from 1986-1997, the 
second phase of development, the KFTC continued to 
focus in this area and improved competition-promoting 
regulations (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2011). 
Also within this period, in 1996, the KFTC was 
promoted to a ministerial-level agency and became the 
official competition authority of South Korea (Korea Fair 
Trade Commission, 2011). Its jurisdiction covers 
matters related to: 
• Regulating abuse of dominance; 
• Restricting combination of enterprises and 
preventing the concentration of market power; 
• Regulating improper cartels and anti-competitive 
behavior; 
• Regulating unfair business practices and resale 
price maintenance; 
• Preventing the conclusion of unfair international 
contracts; 
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• Competition encouragement policies through 
consultation and coordination with respect to 
Acts, subordinate statutes, and administrative 
measures that restrict competition; 
• Other than Acts and subordinate statutes to be 
established (MRFTA, Art. 36).  
The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998 exposed a variety of 
structural economic weaknesses among the Asian 
economies affected by it. South Korea was particularly 
affected—its GDP growth rate plunged from 7% in 
1996 to 4.65% in 1997 to -6.85% in 1998, later 
recovering to about 9.49% in 1999 (World 
Development Indicators Online). 
Lee et al. (2002) note that financial liberalization in 
South Korea went through a process of limited 
liberalization in the 1980s that promoted the growth of 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and stock and 
bond markets, and deregulation of entry restrictions in 
financial institutions in the early 1990s. They observe 
that these were heavily influenced by chaebol interests 
amid generally weak government supervision and 
regulation. According to these authors, this paved the 
way for the financial meltdown in 1997-1998. 
They note that South Korea’s industrial policy in the 
1960s was characterized by a hierarchical relationship 
between the government and selected firms, later to be 
known as chaebols. The government directed and 
funded investments through government-owned banks, 
coordinated activities among interdependent firms and 
imposed objective criteria for choosing firms receiving 
government support. This effectively promoted the fast 
growth of the Korean economy from the 1960s (Lee et 
al. 2002). 
However, as the chaebols grew and gained 
economic power and began to chafe against 
government control, the government-business 
relationship that prevailed began to unravel. With the 
increasing power of the chaebols, government’s 
influence in directing them diminished, while the 
structure of allocating credit remained. This created an 
environment of corruption and rent-seeking. Ha Joon 
Chang claims that this contributed to the crisis of 
confidence in Korean markets that worsened the 1997-
1998 financial crisis in Korea (Lee et al., 2002; Chang, 
1998). 
In addition, when government began to liberalize 
the financial industry, chaebols were quick to take 
advantage of the opportunity to access independent 
financing sources. NBFI deregulation saw the increase 
in chaebol ownership in these institutions and became 
an alternative source of financing to government-
controlled commercial banks. The financial reforms 
were characterized by a paradigm shift to a neo-liberal 
and hands-off approach to economic management. 
This, including deregulating entry into the financial 
sector in the early 1990s, provided a greater 
opportunity for chaebols to control the financial system. 
By 1995, the top 10 chaebols owned an average of 2.5 
NBFIs (Lee et al., 2002).  
Interest rate deregulation, on the other hand, was 
implemented on a piecemeal basis, with short-term 
interest rates deregulated first, and long-term interest 
rates at a later time. As a result, external financing 
became dominated by short term instruments with 
chaebol owned NBFIs being major players in the 
business. Strong lobbying of chaebols for liberalization 
of international financial transactions coupled with 
pressure from international financial capital to access 
the Korean market, resulted in further financial 
deregulation. This included deregulation of foreign-
currency denominated bonds, export-related foreign 
borrowing and removal of the annual ceiling on foreign 
currency loans. However, with the initial deregulation of 
short term instruments, most of the foreign currency 
financing issued were short-term (Lee et al., 2002).  
In the meantime, efforts by the government to rein 
in chaebols during the process of reform in the 1980s 
were generally ineffective in the face of strong chaebol 
opposition. With weak government oversight, by 1997, 
debt-asset ratio of chaebols with no affiliate finance 
companies was 45.9% while those with financing 
affiliates was 56.6%. This, while the rate of return of 
chaebol affiliated finance companies was 0.27% and 
non-affiliated companies was 1%. In other words, debt-
financed investment expanded, while profitability, 
especially of financing institutions, was low. This set 
the stage for the financial crisis of 1997-1998. The 
failure of the chaebols resulted not only to the failure of 
their affiliated finance companies but also of other 
unrelated institutions given the credit linkages among 
these institutions (Lee et al., 2002). 
In an effort to address this after the Asian crisis, the 
KFTC strengthened its enforcement activities against 
large business groups. It conducted investigations on 
alleged wrongdoings and imposing hefty fines on these 
groups. The belief that the chaebols worsened, if not 
caused, the effects of the Asian crisis in the South 
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Korean economy, provided impetus for the KFTC to 
take a more proactive role in competition promotion 
and enforcement. 
Thus, from 1998-2007, the 3
rd
 phase of competition 
promotion and enforcement, the number of corrective 
measures or more stringent sanctions against 
companies increased by three times compared to the 
period from 1986-1997. Surcharge impositions also 
increased 6.7 times compared to the same period. 
Companies that received sanctions included several 
foreign companies including Microsoft (Korea Fair 
Trade Commission, 2011). 
With its more pro-active role in competition 
enforcement, the KFTC also enacted and implemented 
a series of laws aimed at consumer protection, and 
engaged in activities geared towards empowering 
consumers (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2011). The 
KFTC’s competition advocacy activities through the 
enactment or revision of competition laws issued by 
different administrative agencies also steadily 
increased. Government agencies consulted the KFTC 
on matters relating to competition in other government 
legislations. Consultations increased from 430 in 2004 
to 635 in 2007 (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2011). 
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, a fourth 
phase of development of competition policy introduced 
stronger enforcement activities against international 
cartels and detection of possible abuse of market 
dominance by several multinational companies. KFTC 
also expanded the autonomy of market participants by 
establishing mechanisms for consumer complaints and 
promoted shared growth agreements between large 
companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
to encourage voluntary improvement of transaction 
practices. The partnership between these large 
companies and SMEs is seen as a means of 
maintaining the competitiveness of South Korean 
companies against the growing trend of global 
production networks (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 
2011). 
To ensure that its decisions are credible and thus 
minimize unnecessary disputes, the KFTC turned to in-
depth and evidence based economic analysis as a tool 
for providing support to its findings and judgments. It 
also introduced competition impact assessments of 
newly instituted and reinforced regulations as part of its 
mandate to be consulted on and coordinate with other 
government agencies on competition restrictive 
regulations of these agencies. In 2010, as part of its 
competition advocacy measures, the KFTC issued the 
guidelines for review of statutory restriction of 
competition. It sets out guidelines on how to determine 
whether an administrative or legislative issuance is 
anti-competitive or not (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 
2011). 
In addition, since the 1990s, South Korean foreign 
direct investments to other countries started to increase 
dramatically (See Figure 1). It is not coincidental that 
the KFTC increased its international cooperation and 
outreach to other countries on competition related 
matters during this period. South Korea participates in 
discussions for cooperation in competition law and 
policy in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), International Competition 
Network (ICN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and other multilateral fora. It 
is a Bureau member of the OECD Competition 
Committee since 2001, and a member of the Steering 
Group of ICN since its inception in 2001 (Korea Fair 
Trade Commission, 2011).  
South Korea has also recently signed a bilateral 
agreement with the European Union in 2009 entitled, 
“Agreement between the European Community and the 
Government of the Republic of Korea concerning 
cooperation on anti-competitive activities.” (Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2009). In addition, the 
EU-South Korean Free Trade Agreement signed in 
2010, in its Chapter 11, provides harmonized principles 
in maintaining and executing each Party’s competition 
laws, cooperation, consultation and dispute settlement 
mechanisms to address competition issues between 
the Parties, and the application of competition laws in 
removing distortions to competition caused by 
subsidies (Official Journal of the European Union, 
2011). Perhaps, this reflected the need to protect South 
Korean interests as their companies begin to go global. 
As the South Korean economy continued to expand 
after the adoption of liberalization and deregulation 
policies, its competition laws and enforcement also 
continued to evolve. Industry concentration indicators 
have also evolved over time, showing a general 
downward tendency during the last decade (see Tables 
1a; 1b). As GDP per capita grew, signifying increased 
economic activity, and with the broad mandate given to 
it by the MRFTA, the KFTC continued to adapt to the 
evolving market structure of the Korean economy. 
From initial information dissemination, to regulation of 
chaebol activities and transactions, active enforcement 
of the MRFTA provisions against abuses of market
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Figure 1: South Korea Net FDI (constant 2000 US$), 1976-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
 
Table 1a: South Korea Market Concentration Ratio, 1999-2008 
CR3  
Korean Standard Industrial Classification 
(8-digit) 
CR, ? 50%; CR, ? 75%  
Ratio of Highly Concentrated Item 
 
Simple Average Weighted Average CR, ? 50% CR, ? 75% Total 
1999 75.3 68.0 44.0 13.8 57.8 
2000 71.5 65.6 38.8 13.6 52.4 
2001 68.5 64.0 35.4 12.4 47.8 
2002 64.6 61.0 30.9 11.8 42.7 
2003 61.4 60.1 26.5 11.7 38.2 
2004 59.4 61.6 30.0 15.9 45.9 
2005 59.1 61.1 23.3 22.7 46.0 
2006 64.3 62.8 28.4 12.7 41.1 
2007 67.0 65.4 30.7 14.7 45.4 
2008 67.8 66.5 31.3 14.2 45.5 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (2010). Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
 
Table 1b: South Korea Industry Concentration Ratio, 1999-2008 
CR3  
Korean Standard Industrial Classification 
(sub-classification, 5-digit) 
CR, ? 50%; CR, ? 75%  
Ratio of Industries 
 
Simple Average Weighted Average CR, ? 50% CR, ? 75% Total 
1999 49.0 56.7 15.9 6.9 22.8 
2000 44.6 53.9 13.2 5.0 18.2 
2001 45.3 52.8 13.4 6.4 19.8 
2002 43.1 50.8 13.1 5.1 18.2 
2003 43.0 50.9 12.9 4.7 17.6 
2004 44.0 52.2 12.5 5.1 17.6 
2005 43.6 51.6 12.2 4.4 16.6 
2006 45.6 51.2 13.1 5.6 18.7 
2007 45.2 54.2 15.0 5.1 20.1 
2008 45.5 55.3 13.5 5.7 19.2 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (2010). Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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power, consumer protection, promotion of cooperative 
agreements among market players, actions against 
international cartels, and international cooperation and 
outreach both bilaterally and multilaterally (Korea Fair 
Trade Commission, 2011). 
Table 2 summarizes the growth trends of GDP per 
capita/per capita growth, trade openness and net FDI 
inflow during the various stages of competition policy 
development in South Korea. 
3.2. People’s Republic of China 
While pursuing targeted industrial strategies under a 
centrally planned economy, China opened its market to 
competition in the early stages of market reforms from 
the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. Some scholars refer 
to this period as the first stage of policy development 
(Jiang, 2002). During this period, China encouraged 
the entry of new firms, promoted competition among 
existing enterprises and relaxed price controls. Like the 
other East Asian economies of Japan and South 
Korea, China also promoted the growth of large-scale 
enterprises and adopted an export-oriented strategy 
(Lin, 2005). 
It was also within this period, in 1980, that China 
adopted its first major competition policy document, the 
Provisional Regulations Concerning Development and 
Protection of the Socialist Competition Mechanism. Lin 
(2005) notes, however, that the regulations were never 
properly enforced. The regulation prohibited 
monopolistic activities of private enterprises, but 
exempted state-owned companies (Provisional 
Regulations Concerning Development and Protection 
of the Socialist Competition Mechanism, Art. 3). 
Beyond this, the regulation simply declared a general 
policy of introducing competition by breaking down 
regional blockades and departmental barriers. What is 
notable is the regulation’s express recognition of one of 
the major barriers to competition in the Chinese 
economy, administrative monopolies and regional 
protectionism.  
From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, China reversed 
gears and adopted policies that limited the growth of 
new small and medium-sized enterprises, restrained 
competition between rural and state owned enterprises, 
and extended preferential treatment to SOEs. This was 
considered the second stage of policy development. 
The change in policy was a response to the growing 
number of non-state companies that threatened the 
viability of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as 
well as the duplication of investments, among others. In 
this case, industrial policy trumped competition policy 
as China sought to protect government enterprises to 
maintain scale economies and compete in the export 
market (Lin, 2005). By the early to mid-1990s, China 
began to implement policies that veered away from a 
centrally-planned economy toward a more market-
oriented economy. It, however, continued to pursue the 
promotion of large-scale enterprises by encouraging 
the entry of foreign direct investments (FDI), and 
managed mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Lin 2005).  
Among the legislations adopted was China’s first 
competition law, the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law 
(AUCL). The law prohibited:  
(a) Fraudulent acts against consumers, such as 
deceptive advertising and deceptive sales 
tactics, 
(b) Dishonesty in business transactions, such as 
bribery, and uttering and disseminating false 
information that would hurt the reputation of a 
competitor; 
(c) Violation of intellectual property rights and 
unlawful acquisition and disclosure of trade 
secrets; and  
(d) Anti-competitive conduct, such as restrictions on 
the use of related products imposed by public 
enterprises and legal monopolies, abuse of 
administrative power or restraints on regional 
free trade by government agencies, predatory 
pricing, tied sales and bid rigging (Lin, 2005). 
Table 2: Summary of Growth Trends for the Period 1981-2010 
  1981-1986 1987-1997 1998-2007 2008-2010 
GDP Per Capita ($2000) 4,195.67 7,948.82 12,528.20 15,764.33 
GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) 6.91 6.96 3.84 2.63 
Trade openness (X+M/GDP) 0.33 0.46 0.8 1.04 
Net FDI inflow (% of GDP) 0.18 0.37 0.96 0.2 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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However, the law only provided penalties for 
trademark infringement and bribery. It is thus not 
surprising that implementation of the law by its 
administering agency, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) substantially involved 
administrative measures and very little criminal 
prosecution. Measures were mostly directed at 
consumer protection and business dishonesty, anti-
trust violations, trademark infringement and unlawful 
use of trade secrets (Lin, 2005). 
It was only from 1995-2002 that SAIC stepped up 
actions against administrative monopolies, a large 
number of which involved public utilities. This reflected 
the increased attention of the SAIC in fighting abuse of 
administrative power and restrictive practices of public 
utilities. It was also promoted to a ministerial level 
agency, thus consolidating its authority over 
competition matters under the AUCL (Lin, 2005). 
In 1998, China adopted another competition law, 
the Price Law. The law was directed at fighting cartels, 
price fixing and predatory pricing. It imposed stiff fines 
against violations of the law. The administering 
authority of the law is the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC). For lack of available 
records on the NDRC, the extent of its enforcement 
actions cannot yet be established (Lin, 2005).  
In 2007, China adopted its latest and most 
comprehensive competition law, the Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML). The law contains an express prohibition 
against administrative organs to pass laws or 
regulations that eliminate or restrict competition (AML, 
Art. 8). Again, this is intended to counter widespread 
administrative and regional monopolies. In addition, the 
AML contains some standard provisions on 
monopolies, abuse of market dominance, and merger 
review. It also provides for procedures on monopoly 
investigations, and liabilities of violators. 
The AML also led to the creation of the Anti-
Monopoly Commission (AMC) which is responsible for 
studying and drafting competition policies, investigating 
and assessing competition conditions in the market and 
issuing assessment reports, issuing anti-monopoly 
guidelines, and coordinating anti-monopoly 
administrative enforcement, among others (AML, Art. 
9). The AML performs critically important coordinating 
functions—it oversees the work of three Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs): (a) the Anti-Monopoly 
Bureau under the Ministry of Commerce for merger 
review; (b) the NDRC for price related infringements; 
and (c) the SAIC for non-price related infringements 
noted above (Ha, 2011). 
So far, most the activities of the AMEAs under the 
AML since the law became effective up to December 
2010 have been focused on developing the 
implementing rules of the law. Actions taken by NDRC 
and SAIC under pre-AML laws were mostly directed at 
cartels in politically sensitive sectors, and warnings 
against other anti-competitive practices. Among the 
challenges of the AMEAs in enforcement is the 
shortage of skilled personnel, although training 
activities have increased, as well as cooperation and 
collaboration with foreign anti-trust regulators (Ha, 
2011). 
Unlike South Korea, China has only very recently 
begun strengthening and implementing its main 
competition laws. It faces, among other challenges, 
coordination problems among various implementing 
agencies, as well as a shortage of qualified and skilled 
personnel. But like South Korea, its early efforts at 
competition regulation were also primarily directed at 
one of the major obstacles to competition, 
administrative and regional monopolies, both of which 
carry a strong imprint of the public sector (albeit at 
different levels). 
As trade openness grew from 1996 onwards, the 
economy expanded as reflected in GDP per capita, and 
efforts at passing and implementing a competition law 
also gained ground. This seems to indicate that once 
the positive effects of competition and other 
development policies are felt in the economy, there is 
greater room for initiating and continuing the 
implementation of such law. In addition, just like South 
Korea, China has also reached out to other countries in 
order to cooperate on the implementation of 
competition policy. 
For example, it has been engaging in dialogues 
over competition policy matters with the European 
Union since the adoption of the Joint Statement 
adopted at the EU-China Summit on 05 September 
2001 where competition policy was identified as one of 
the areas where dialogues between the countries will 
be intensified (Joint Statement. Fourth EU-China 
Summit. 2001). The Joint Statement has since been 
followed by the Terms of Reference of the EU-China 
Competition Policy Dialogue signed on 06 May 2004. 
The Terms of Reference identified contact points 
between the two parties, the specific areas of dialogue, 
and provision of technical assistance and capacity 
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building, among others (Terms of Reference of the EU-
China Competition Policy Dialogue, 2004). 
Also, in April 2011, China, together with the other 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
countries signed the Sanya Declaration of the BRICS 
Leaders Meeting, where the Parties agreed to hold the 
2
nd
 BRICS International Competition Conference in 
September 2011. (Sanya Declaration, 2011). The 
conference was held in Beijing and discussed 
competition enforcement in the context of economic 
globalization (BRICS International Competition 
Conference website). 
Table 3 below summarizes the growth trends of 
GDP per capita/per capita growth, trade openness and 
net FDI inflow during the various stages of industrial 
and competition policy development in China. 
3.3. India 
India’s economic development trajectory since its 
independence could be divided into three stages: a) 
 
Figure 2: China Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports over GDP), 1978-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
 
Figure 3: China GDP per Capita (constant 2000 US$), 1979-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Growth Trends from 1975-2010 
  1975-1984 1985-1995 1996-2010 
GDP Per Capita ($2000) 185.2 434.72 1350.8 
GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) 6.7 8.92 9.1 
Trade openness (X+M/GDP) 0.42 0.3 0.58 
Net FDI inflow (% of GDP) 0.31 2.37 3.77 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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Command control economy in 1950-1984; b) Modest 
liberal reforms in 1985-1990; c) More fundamental 
market-oriented reforms from 1991-present. From 1950 
to the early 1980s, the Indian government heavily 
subsidized agricultural development and invested 
heavily in large scale industries. With its reliance on 
government to fast track the development of a self-
sufficient economy, it nationalized banks, implemented 
regulatory and licensing structures to direct private 
investments to priority sectors, imposed high tariffs on 
consumer goods, imposed foreign exchange controls 
and discouraged foreign investments (Kaushik, 1997).  
In particular, the Industry (Development and 
Regulations) Act of 1951 mandated the government to 
reserve certain industries for the public sector and 
imposed licensing requirements for new ventures and 
substantial expansion in the private sector. To prevent 
the concentration of wealth, two other legislations were 
enacted: the Capital Issues (Control) Act of 1947 and 
the Indian Companies Act of 1956. The Capital Issues 
Act promoted the wide distribution of share ownership, 
while the Companies Act restricted inter-corporate 
investments and directorships (Rajakumar and Henly, 
2007). 
However, an evaluation of these policies by the 
Indian government in the 1960s showed an increase in 
large business groups from 1951 to 1968. It was noted 
by one of the investigating committees that the then 
existing controls in fact helped large firms by restricting 
the entry of new firms (Rajakumar and Henly 2007). 
Thus, in 1969, India passed the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act that regulated 
monopolistic and restrictive trade practices. The Act 
required large and dominant firms (as defined by the 
MRTP Act) to register with the Central Government, 
and to secure government approval for expansions, 
mergers, new ventures and appointment of directors in 
other companies. Limits were also imposed on the total 
assets that these firms can accumulate (Bhattacharjea, 
2008). 
However, tight government controls in the economy 
and an inward-looking strategy, promoted inefficient 
industries and a “license-permit-quota raj” that stifled 
competition. The results of these strategies showed 
sluggish growth from the ‘50s to the early 1980s, 
averaging 3-5 percent, with average annual increase of 
per capita income at 1.3 percent. This, while growth 
rates in the developing world during a period of 
expansion of global trade, averaged at 3 percent per 
capita (Das, 2006).  
During the 1970s, industrialists began to lobby for 
liberalization, particularly, in the importation of raw 
materials and machinery. In the early 1970s, the 
government gradually relaxed industry regulation, and 
trade regulation in the late 1970s. More substantial 
reforms were put in place starting 1985 through import 
liberalization, decline of the government’s monopoly 
rights over certain imports, easing of regulation of the 
private sector, and provision of export incentives. Also, 
the asset limit imposed on large and dominant firms 
under the MRTP Act was raised from 1985-1986, which 
freed up these firms to venture into new products and 
businesses (Panagariya, 2004). 
However, while average growth increased to around 
5.6 percent as a result of these reforms, unchecked 
spending and a growing public debt contributed to 
India’s fiscal problems in the early 1990s (Das, 2006). 
In 1991, India adopted sweeping and significant 
economic policy reforms that included removal of most 
import quotas, further reduction of tariff and non tariff 
barriers, liberalization of foreign investments, industry 
deregulation, and limitation of the scope of participation 
of the public sector in industry (Das, 2006; Kohli, 2006; 
Konchar, Kumar, Rajan, Arvind and Tokatlidis, 2006). 
Licensing and registration requirements for large and 
dominant firms under the MRTP Act were also 
removed, except for a few industries (Bhattacharjea, 
2008). And more importantly, approach to economic 
policy-making also underwent a paradigm shift. From a 
“command and control” economy, policy shifted to the 
adoption of market principles (Panagariya, 2004). 
While there was a slight increase in GDP per capita 
since the 1980 reforms, there appeared to be a more 
marked increase after the 1991 reforms. Trade 
openness, likewise increased since the 1991 reforms. 
Since the late 1960s, India adopted two competition 
laws: (a) the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices (MRTP) Act of 1969; and (b) the Competition 
Law of 2002, which superseded the MRTP Act. The 
MRTP Act regulated monopolistic and restrictive trade 
practices (1969) and unfair trade practices (1984 
amendment) (MRTPA, Sections 10 (a) and (b), 36A 
and 36B; Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs 2004-
2005; Bhattacharjea 2008). It also established the 
MRTP Commission, a quasi-judicial body attached to 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, to enforce the 
provisions of the MRTP Act (MRTPA, Section 5). 
Bhattacharjea tracked the cases instituted under the 
MRTP Act based on earlier tabulations from different 
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sources. He notes that most cases initiated from 1972-
2006 were for unfair and restrictive trade practices and 
were mostly instituted by consumer groups. 
Battacharjea also observed that a number of these 
cases could have been addressed under India’s 
Consumer Protection Act (COPRA), which had similar 
provisions on unfair trade practices and a 
compensation mechanism to consumers (2008). 
There are very few cases involving monopolistic 
trade practices. This was attributed to the removal of 
licensing requirements for large businesses in the 
1990s, as well as the erratic enforcement of the 
provisions on aggregate concentration (Bhattacharjea, 
2008). It is worthy to note, however, that analysis by 
Rajakumar and Henly of the growth of business groups 
from 1970-1991 showed that the policies adopted 
under the MRTP Act slowed the growth of large 
business groups from 1972 to 1989 (2007). 
With the implementation of market reforms since 
1991, the MRTP Act was deemed to be insufficient to 
meet the challenges of the new policy environment. 
Thus in 2003, a new competition law, the Competition 
Act of 2002 was enacted. The Competition Act covers: 
(a) prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, including 
cartels (Competition Act, Section 3); (b) prohibition 
against abuse of dominant position (Competition Act, 
Section 4); (c) regulation of mergers and acquisitions of 
large corporations (Competition Act, Sections 5 and 6); 
and (d) competition advocacy (Competition Act, 
Section 49). It also established the Competition 
Commission of India (CCI), a quasi-judicial body 
authorized to investigate, hear, decide cases and 
sanction violations of the Competition Act, as well as 
regulate mergers and acquisitions (Competition Act, 
Sections 18 and 40). Amendments in 2007 established 
the Competition Appellate Tribunal authorized to hear 
cases on appeal from the CCI (Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs 2010-2011). 
 
      
Figure 4: India GDP per Capita (constant 2000 US$), 1960-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, World Bank. 
 
Figure 5: India Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports over GDP), 1960-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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After amendments in 2007 and 2009, the 
Competition Act became effective on September 1, 
2009. The MRTP Commission was then dissolved in 
October 2009, and the CCI took over its functions. 
Pending cases of the MRTP Commission were also 
transferred to the CCI as a result (Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs 2010-2011).  
From the period 2009 to 2010, CCI activities were 
chiefly focused on hiring personnel, formulating 
relevant regulations, competition advocacy, capacity 
building, and conducting relevant research and market 
studies. It has also reached out to other competition 
authorities from different jurisdictions and is 
considering entering into Memoranda of Understanding 
with these authorities. It has also acted on a few cases 
filed as well as those transferred by the MRTP 
Commission (Competition Commission of India 2009-
2010). 
While India had earlier adopted a competition law, 
its implementation under a government controlled-
economy was flawed. Its efforts to curtail the growth of 
large business groups did not have any significant 
impact on economic growth or in fostering a more 
competitive environment. In the end, most of the cases 
handled by the MRTP Commission were consumer 
cases that could, in some instances, have been 
properly addressed under India’s consumer protection 
law, thus creating an overlap of governmental functions 
(Bhattacharjea, 2008). 
With the new competition law having been adopted 
only in 2009, it remains to be seen how the CCI will 
promote competition in the market. However, its initial 
activities show an understanding of the challenges in 
promoting competition in an environment that is in the 
process of adopting market principles, while still 
carrying the baggage of a government-controlled 
economy.  
Table 4 below summarizes the growth trends of 
GDP per capita/per capita growth, trade openness and 
net FDI inflow during the various stages of 
industrialization strategy and competition policy 
development in India. 
3.4. Indonesia 
It is possible to identify four distinct stages in 
Indonesia’s economic development since its 
independence: a) Early independence years from 
1950-1958; b) Guided democracy and economy years 
from 1959-1965 under President Sukarno; c) New 
order years under President Suharto from 1966-1998; 
and d) Post-Asian crisis years from 1999 to present. 
After its independence from the Dutch in 1949, 
Indonesian economic policies from 1950 to 1965 were 
characterized by economic nationalism that translated 
into hostility against foreign capital, particularly Dutch 
and ethnic Chinese due to their continuing dominance 
in the Indonesian economy (Wie, 2006).  
Among the early actions taken by the new 
government was to nationalize the Java Bank, the bank 
of circulation during the Dutch colonial times. It also 
established two state-owned banks, the Bank Industri 
Negara (BIN) that was established to finance industrial 
projects, and the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), a 
foreign-exchange bank that finance importers. 
Nationalization then extended to Dutch companies 
including public utilities and railways. The government 
also established state corporations for cement 
production, textiles, automobile assembly, glass and 
bottle manufacture and hardboard (Wie, 2006; 
Robison, 2009). 
In a bid to ensure the growth of indigenous 
Indonesian businessmen, the Indonesian government 
adopted affirmative programs, such as licensing 
preferences to indigenous business on import trade, 
transfer of ownership of certain businesses from ethnic 
Chinese to indigenous Indonesians, and banning of 
foreign nationals from rural retail trade. Subsidies and 
easy credit terms from state-owned banks were also 
granted to indigenous businessmen (Robison, 2009). 
Table 4: Summary of Growth Trends from 1950-2010 
  1950-1985 1986-1990 1991-2010 
GDP Per Capita ($2000) 207.77 294 501.9 
GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) 2.53 3.77 4.89 
Trade openness (X+M/GDP) 0.11 0.14 0.31 
Net FDI inflow (% of GDP) 0.02 0.06 1.05 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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This, however, led to a culture of patronage, where 
members of political parties, particularly the largest 
party Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) or the Indonesian 
National Party, and government bureaucrats and 
individual capitalists allocated state credit, licenses, 
monopolies, contracts and other concessions among 
themselves to gain economic advantages. This period 
saw the transition of government officials and 
bureaucrats into business owners. These officials 
turned business owners used their influence to gain 
license permits, mostly import licenses, and secure 
government contracts (Robison, 2009). 
Like other patronage systems, access to 
government resources and connections were 
unpredictable and dependent on persons in power. 
This led to short-term speculation and high profit 
ventures. Among the schemes adopted were 
overpricing of imported goods that allowed 
businessmen to accumulate capital reserves that they 
kept in foreign currency abroad which they then used to 
finance domestic investments (Robison, 2009).  
Efforts to create an indigenous merchant 
bourgeoisie were generally unsuccessful. This was 
attributed to the limited entrepreneurial skills of the 
indigenous Indonesians, as well as their misuse of 
government support, such as acting as fronts for 
Chinese importers or engaging in corrupt practices, 
including colluding with powerful figures and 
bureaucrats in allocating import licenses and credit. 
What the government ended up creating was a group 
of license brokers and political fixers rather than an 
indigenous merchant bourgeoisie (Wie, 2008; Robison, 
2009). 
The whole experience showed Indonesian 
policymakers that indigenous capitalists were not 
capable of driving economic growth, that locally, 
Chinese capital is integral to domestic investment, and 
that indigenous and ethnic Chinese capital were not 
sufficient to replace foreign capital that could finance 
large-scale growth. This led to the conviction that 
economic growth led by indigenous capital can only be 
achieved under a state led economy, as the state is the 
only entity capable of financing large industries and 
directing policy to support these industries (Robison, 
2009). 
By 1959, President Sukarno restructured the 
political structures of government by establishing an 
authoritarian regime with the President and the military 
as the centers of authority. He abandoned the 
government’s affirmative action programs and 
introduced his Guided Democracy and Guided 
Economy program. He took on a socialist approach to 
economic planning by prioritizing the growth of state-
owned enterprises. Foreign direct investments and 
domestic private capital were also generally 
discouraged, although the state continued to engage 
foreign capital in joint ventures and production sharing. 
Foreign investments, mostly Dutch, were expropriated 
and transferred to state ownership and the Foreign 
Investments Law earlier enacted in 1957 was repealed 
in 1958 (Wie, 2006; Robison, 2009). 
However, state-owned enterprises were generally 
inefficient and suffered from poor management, as 
managers were usually political appointees whose 
decisions were driven by personal gain and the 
interests of their political patrons. This resulted in 
losses and declines in revenues. Among those affected 
were Indonesia’s exports, which declined due to lack of 
capital investments, mismanagement and widespread 
smuggling. Even industries that where left to private 
business were also adversely affected by uncertainty in 
prices, supplies and government regulations (Robison, 
2009). 
Efforts to build an industrial sector also failed due to 
limited capital as a result of declining export earnings, a 
burgeoning foreign debt (about US$2 billion in mid-
1960s) and limited capacity to collect taxes. 
Government mismanagement of the economy resulted 
in economic collapse and chaos that precipitated the 
overthrow of President Sukarno (Robison, 2009). 
President Suharto replaced Sukarno in 1966, and 
he adopted the New Order regime that initially 
dismantled the old regime’s socialist policies, and later 
began to liberalize the economy. The new government 
removed most controls over foreign investment by 
enacting another Foreign Investment Law and a 
Domestic Investment Law that provided similar 
incentives and guarantees to private investors. It also 
curbed the activities of state-owned enterprises and 
removed government subsidies and preferential access 
to government-owned banks (Wie, 2006).  
While liberalizing the economy, the new government 
also adopted a protectionist import substitution strategy 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. The favourable 
investment climate, in general, however, showed an 
increase in both foreign and domestic investments in 
various industries such as textiles, electronics, 
transport equipment and pharmaceuticals. Trade 
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openness during the period from 1969 to the mid-
1970s began to rise. 
However, the oil boom in 1973 and 1978 
precipitated a series of interventionist policies, as oil 
revenues provided substantial capital to the state to 
embark on another effort at import substitution 
industrialization. The state invested in large-scale basic 
industries and reversed its liberal investment policies. 
When the oil boom ended in 1982, the government 
reverted to liberal trade and investment policies. It also 
deregulated certain industries and implemented a 
series of trade reforms arising from its commitments 
under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). 
Among these commitments under the 1992 Agreement 
on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (“CEPT Agreement”) 
include the exploration of measures on rules on fair 
competition (CEPT Agreement, Art. 5 [C]).  
Incidentally, under the Declaration on the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint signed by the 
ASEAN member states on 20 November 2007, the 
State Parties committed to promote fair competition 
within the AEC by 2015. This will be accomplished 
through various initiatives, such as introducing 
competition policy in all ASEAN Member States, 
capacity building, establishing a network of competition 
authorities and developing regional guidelines on 
competition policy (ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint. 2007). 
In addition to trade reforms, Indonesia also began to 
adopt an export oriented strategy in certain industries 
that attracted foreign direct investments. This resulted 
to a boom in investment until the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 (Wie, 2006; Dowling, 2006). 
Some analysts point to the inefficiency generated by 
“crony capitalism” that may have contributed to 
Indonesia’s crisis vulnerability (Summers, 1998). 
Analysts noted that prior to the crisis, the business 
interests of the Suharto family trumped the national 
economic interests. Corruption, collusive behaviour 
among the political and economic elite, and nepotism 
was rampant. Productivity declined, while the gap 
between the rich and poor widened (Wie, 2006). The 
onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1998 resulted in a 
deep contraction in Indonesia’s economy. It took until 
about 2004 for real GDP per capita to recover to its 
pre-crisis (1997) level. 
As a result of the Asian crisis, Indonesia was 
brought under the supervision of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1997 to the end of 2003 in 
exchange for a bail-out package of US$46 billion. 
During this period, substantial institutional changes 
were made, including constitutional revisions, 
expansion of local autonomy, enactment of the Central 
Bank Law that ensured the independence of the Bank 
of Indonesia, state finance and national planning. 
Market reforms were also put in place, such as 
reduction in export taxes, elimination of certain 
monopolies, liberalization of imports of many 
agricultural products, and removal of FDI restrictions 
(Hill and Shiraishi, 2007; Dowling, 2006). 
Among the laws that the IMF required Indonesia to 
pass was the Competition Law (Law No. 5 of 1999 
Concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices 
 
Figure 6: Indonesia Trade Openness (constant 2000 US$), 1960-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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and Unhealthy/Unfair Business Competition) (Dowling, 
2006). The enforcing agency for this law is the 
Commission to Monitor Business Competition (KPPU). 
The Competition Law contains standard provisions on 
monopoly, monopsony, anti-competitive behaviour, 
abuse of dominant position, cartelization, price fixing, 
horizontal and vertical agreements. It also authorizes 
the KPPU to investigate complaints for violation of its 
provisions, and provides remedies for appeal in the 
district courts and the Supreme Court (See Law No. 5 
of 1999 Concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices and Unhealthy/Unfair Business Competition). 
Analysts contend that implementation and 
interpretation of the law by the KPPU has been 
plagued with faulty economic reasoning and legal 
interpretation due to inadequacy of its capabilities to 
carry out its mandate. This has resulted in reversals by 
Indonesian courts of a number of cases the KPPU 
previously decided on. This has contributed to an 
environment of uncertainty in the implementation of the 
Competition Law (Sternberg, 2011). 
The economic policies and strategies from the 
Sukarno to the Suharto era is clearly not linear, and 
could be characterized by wide swings from economic 
nationalism, to some degree of liberalization, to 
interventionism, and once again to a return to 
liberalization. Issues of corruption, nepotism and rent-
seeking also surfaced during much of this period, 
further hindering a culture of competition despite efforts 
toward liberalization. The crisis in 1997-1998 brought 
all of these issues to a head. The subsequent 
sweeping reforms in the country—including the 
adoption of a competition law in 1999—began to 
address many of these structural vulnerabilities in the 
Indonesian economy. Indonesia’s recent experience 
shows that liberalization without a strong regulatory 
environment to control the excesses of the economic 
players (i.e., the state or individual firms) could lead to 
fundamental structural weaknesses.  
Table 5 below summarizes the growth trends of 
GDP per capita/per capita growth, trade openness and 
net FDI inflow during the various stages of economic 
and competition policy development in Indonesia. 
3.5. Philippines 
Like many developing countries, Philippines too 
adopted the model of import substitution in the quest 
for rapid industrialization during the post-war years. A 
complex arrangement of protective policies, investment 
incentives, and regulatory controls emerged. Over time 
these policies resulted in the protection of the 
 
Figure 7: Indonesia GDP per Capita (constant 2000 US$), 1960-2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
Table 5: Summary of Growth Trends for the Period 1950-2010 
  1950-1958 1959-1965 1966-1998 1999-2010 
GDP Per Capita ($2000) not available 201.33 494.39 917 
GDP Per Capita Growth not available -0.47 4.25 3.58 
Trade openness (X+M/GDP) not available 0.6 0.74 0.76 
Net FDI inflow (% of GDP) not available not available 0.89 0.42 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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entrenched elites and resulted in rent seeking behavior 
(Medalla, 2002). The liberalization process started with 
the key reforms such as the unilateral tariff reduction 
program in 1981 and 1982 known as Tariff Reform 
Program I (TRP 1) and Import Liberalization Program. 
This was followed in 1991 by the Tariff Reform 
Program II and 1996 by Tariff Reform Program III. 
There were certain multilateral agreements entered into 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreements. There has been a gradual reduction of 
tariffs and removal of import restrictions that 
commenced in 1986 and continues into the present 
day. 
In order to prevent unfair competition a number of 
acts are in place (see Table 7):  
Recently, President Aquino signed Executive Order 
No. 45 (EO 45) in June 2010 which designated the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) as the Competition 
Authority of the Philippines. The EO also created the 
Office for Competition under the Office of Secretary of 
Justice and tasked it to exercise jurisdiction over 
competition matters (EO 45, Sections 1 and 2). It has 
the following responsibilities:  
• Investigate all cases involving violations of 
competition laws and prosecute violators to 
prevent, restrain and punish monopolization, 
cartels and combinations in restraint of trade; 
• Enforce competition policies and laws to protect 
consumers from abusive, fraudulent, or harmful 
corrupt business practices; 
• Supervise competition in markets by ensuring 
that prohibitions and requirements of competition 
laws are adhered to, and to this end, call on 
other government agencies and/or entities for 
submission of reports and provision for 
assistance; 
• Monitor and implement measures to promote 
transparency and accountability in markets; 
• Prepare, publish and disseminate studies and 
reports on competition to inform and guide the 
industry and consumers; and 
• Promote international cooperation and 
strengthen Philippine trade relations with other 
countries, economies, and institutions in trade 
agreements (EO 45, Sec. 1). 
However, since the executive order is merely an 
executive issuance by the President, it is subordinate 
to existing laws passed by the Philippine legislature.  
Rules on competition, including liberalization and 
deregulation legislations, are found in various 
Philippine laws. Provisions of the Philippine 
Constitution (Art. XII, Section 19) Revised Penal Code 
Table 6: Sector-Specific Reforms 
1. Investment Liberalization (Foreign Investments Act (1991) 
2.  Foreign Exchange Liberalization (1992) 
3. Banking (BSP Law (1993), Foreign Bank Liberalization Act (1994) 
4. Telecommunications (1995 
5. Civil Aviation (1995) 
6. Downstream Oil Deregulation (1998) 
7. Retail Liberalization (2000) 
8. Electric Power Industry (2001) 
9. Shipping (2004) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Table 7: Acts Preventing Unfair Competition (Selected) 
1. Revised Penal Code, Art. 186; Pep. Act No. 3247(1930) 
2. Civil Code, Art. 28(1949) 
3. Tariff and Customs Code, Arts. 301 and 302 (1957) 
4. Intellectual Property Code, Arts. 168 to 169 (1997) 
5. Price Act, Sec. 5(3) (1992) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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(Arts. 185 and 186), Civil Code (Art. 28), and various 
legislations such as the Intellectual Property Code 
(1997), the Price Act (1992) address unfair trade 
practices and unfair competition. Sectoral laws and 
issuances covering foreign investments (Republic Act 
7042, as amended), banking (Republic Act No. 7721), 
telecommunications (Republic Act No. 7925), civil 
aviation (Executive Order No. 219), downstream oil 
(Republic Act No. 8479), electric power (Republic Act 
No. 9136) and shipping (Republic Act No 9295), 
promote varying stages of privatization, liberalization, 
deregulation and competition (see Table 6). 
Enforcement of these laws are also dispersed 
among different courts and administrative agencies. 
This makes for a confusing tangle of state policies and 
enforcement agencies, which EO 45 does not have the 
power nor jurisdiction to address.  
Efforts are thus underway to pass a comprehensive 
competition law. The Philippine legislature, both the 
House of Representatives (House Bill No. 4835) and 
the Senate (Senate Bill No.3098), have been 
considering their own versions of a competition bill in 
the previous 15
th
 Congress. The House version has 
been submitted to the plenary body for discussion and 
voting. The Senate Bill was under consideration in the 
Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce. However, 
with the election of the 16
th
 Congress in May 2013, 
these bills were deemed not filed and will have to be 
re-filed again for consideration.  
Key elements of the bills filed in the previous 
Congress include prevention of cartelization, 
monopolization, abuse of dominant position, merger 
and acquisition, and other unfair competition practices. 
(See HB 4835 and SB 3098). 
Table 8: Competition Laws in Selected South East Asian Countries 
ASEAN 
Member 
Country 
Competition 
Law/ Name 
of 
Legislation 
Competition 
Authority 
Prohibition 
of 
Restrictive 
activities 
Prohibition 
of abuse of 
Dominance 
Prohibition of 
anticompetitive 
mergers 
Prohibition 
of Unfair 
Practices 
Leniency 
Program 
Penalties 
Indonesia Yes/ Law of 
the Rep. of 
Indonesia no. 
5, 1999 
“Prohibition of 
Monopolistic 
Practices and 
Unfair 
Business 
Competition” 
Yes, Commission 
for the 
Supervision of 
Business 
Competition 
Yes, Chapters 
III & IV set out 
the prohibited 
agreements 
and  
activities 
Yes, Chapter 
IV & Chapter 
V 
set out the 
prohibitions 
on 
monopolies 
and abuse of 
dominance 
respectively 
Yes, Article 28/ 
Mandatory 
notification for 
post merger (i) 
asset value above 
2.5 trillion Rupiah 
and/or (ii) sales 
value above 5 
trillion Rupiah. 20 
trillion Rupiah 
combined asset 
threshold applies 
to banking sector 
No, Separate 
regulation 
under the 
Law on 
Consumer 
Protection 
No.8 of 
1999 
No,  Administrativ
e directions 
and fines 
from 1b to 
25b rupiah 
and criminal 
sanctions 
including 
fines up to 
100b Rupiah, 
or a 
maximum 6 
month jail 
term.  
Malaysia Yes/ 
Competition 
Act 2010 
Yes/Competition 
Commission of 
Malaysia 
Yes, Section 4 
prohibits 
anticompetitive 
agreements 
Yes, Section 
10 prohibits 
abuse of 
dominance 
No No, Separate 
regulation 
under the 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 1999 
Yes Administrativ
e directions/ 
fines up to 
10%of the 
worldwide 
turnover of 
the 
enterprise for 
the period of 
infringement 
Philippines No Yes/ Office for 
Competition 
under the 
Department of 
Justice 
Competition issues are addressed through several different laws that are 
enforced by respective sector regulators  
No Administrative 
directions 
fines and/or 
jail terms 
under the 
respective 
sectoral 
legislation.  
Thailand Yes/ Trade 
Competition 
Act B.E. 
2542(A.D. 
1999) 
Yes Trade 
Competition 
Commission 
Yes, Section 27 
prohibits 
specific types of 
anticompetitive 
agreement  
Yes, Section 
25 prohibits 
specific 
behaviors by 
dominant 
operator 
Yes, See Section 
26/Mandatory 
notification once 
thresholds met 
(Thresholds to be 
released) 
Yes, Section 
29 prohibits 
acts against 
fair and 
free 
competition 
No Jail term of 
up to 3 years 
and or fine of 
up to 6 m 
baht and 
double 
penalty for 
repeat 
offences 
Source: Drew and Napier LLC (2012). 
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A country comparison with several other South East 
Asian countries in Table 6 reveals the main difference 
between the fast growing economies and the 
Philippines. The Philippines does not have a coherent 
and comprehensive competition policy and law. For the 
various possible violations of competitive practices 
there is a multitude of laws and regulations that govern.  
The Philippine manufacturing industry was most 
favored by policy makers in terms of protection and 
incentives received from the 1950s and 60s. Through 
strong regulation, prices, domestic supply and market 
entry were effectively controlled by government 
institutions that were mandated to promote growth and 
development in industry. Automobile, cement, trucks, 
integrated steel, electrical appliances, sugar milling, 
flour milling, textile, synthetic fibre, and paper were 
some of the protected industries. The government 
encouraged collusion among industries such as 
cement and created a state controlled monopoly in iron 
and steel. Entry barriers were created in glass 
manufacturing, pulp and paper (Aldaba, 2008). After 3 
decades of protectionism and import substitution 
policies the government started the liberalization 
process by removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers from 
the early 1980s.  
The first major reform started in 1981 under a World 
Bank structural adjustment loan. TRP I was the major 
part of the overall trade policy package covering tariff 
reform, removal of import restrictions, elimination of the 
tax protection schemes and curtailment of exemptions 
of the import substitution industries. Further reforms 
were seen in 1991, 1992, up to 2001 when the TRP IV 
was passed to adjust the tariff structure to a uniform 
rate of 5%. In 2003 there was a comprehensive tariff 
review. Imported goods that are not locally produced 
experienced low tariffs and imported goods that are 
also locally produced experienced an upward tariff 
adjustment to level out the playing field (Medalla, 
2002). 
Over the subsequent differing political regimes in 
the Philippines, manufacturing became oligopolistic in 
nature. During President Marcos’s regime in particular, 
the monopolistic and oligopolistic nature of Philippines’ 
industry further strengthened (Kushida, 2003). The first 
Aquino administration (1986-1992) heralded the era of 
liberalization. The Ramos presidency (1992-98) built on 
the reforms and put a greater thrust on privatization 
(Canlas, 2007). Estrada’s regime (1998-01) saw some 
reversals but some continuity in trade policy. The 
Arroyo administration (2001-10) saw an average 
economic growth rate of 5% over nine years. 
However, despite the removal of many tariff barriers 
the industrial sector has stagnated for years and even 
decreased its share in GDP from 38% in 1980 and 15% 
of employment to 22% of GDP and 10% of employment 
by 2009 (ADB, 2010). Compared to neighboring 
countries this is a reverse trend in the manufacturing 
sector. Empirical work on the impact of trade 
liberalization in developing countries indicates that 
trade reforms were accompanied by falling mark-ups, 
productivity growth, technology advancement, and a 
reallocation of resources towards more efficient firms 
(Aldaba, 2005). But in the Philippines, liberalization 
failed to bring about these changes. Despite various 
reforms, much of the manufacturing sector remains 
structured as oligopoly businesses. Pharmaceutical 
drugs, automotive industry, shipbuilding and repair, 
cement and oil all remain oligopolistic in nature.
6
 
In the services sector the result of liberalization 
policies has been fairly successful. This is illustrated by 
the banking sector. After 30 years of interventionist 
financial policies, Philippines initiated a financial 
liberalization program from early 1980s by liberalizing 
interest rates and easing restrictions on financial 
institutions. Further reforms were instituted in 1986 to 
address the interlinked problems of fraud, abuse and 
other insider problems. The 1990s marked the 
deregulation of entry of new domestic banks, 
deregulation of bank branches and the easing of 
restrictions on the entry of foreign banks. There was a 
progressive increase in minimum capitalization and 
mergers to promote financially strong well-managed 
banking systems. In 2000, a General Banking Law was 
enacted to replace the 52 year old general banking act. 
Apart from other innovations, the law encouraged 
microfinance banking. It was observed that after the 
entry of foreign banks that are more cost efficient and 
profit oriented, the gap between the performance of 
local banks and foreign banks actually narrowed. The 
banking sector can be broadly defined as partially 
oligopolistic and partially competitive in nature 
(Manlagni, Lamberte, 2005). In the present time, the 
Philippines banking industry has displayed resilience to 
the vagaries of the financial markets and the various 
financial crises that have hit the world economy 
                                            
6
Aldaba (2004), Lecciones (2004), Aldaba (2007) and Aldaba (2008). 
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recently. Despite the difficult global financial 
environment the local banks have performed well. 
While the financial sector has met with mixed 
success, others such as the airline industry are more 
typical. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1952 gave the 
CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) and the ATO (Air 
Transportation Office) the authority to promote 
adequate economical and efficient passenger airline 
service, to promote competition between the various 
passenger airline services and to develop the airline 
industry in the Philippines. In 1973 with a shift in policy, 
PAL became a virtual monopoly. The Philippines’ one 
airline policy resulted in a government monopoly. The 
government compelled PAL to subsidize missionary 
routes, the airline restricted the number of departures 
and passenger seats in a number of high density 
markets (Manuela, 2007). The air transport industry 
was deregulated in 1995 with the removal of 
restrictions on domestic routes and frequencies and 
government control on rates and charges. EO 219 
legislated the changes in traffic rights and routes and 
carriers that may be designated the country’s flag 
carriers. In 1992 the government privatized PAL after 
14 years of operations. In 1999 business magnate 
Lucio Tan was able to control 90 percent of PAL. 
Among air cargo business, Clark field and Subic 
airports have been open to foreign freighters through 
EO no. 253 issued in 2003. Unlike the banking 
industry, the airline industry has gained only marginally 
from deregulation. Adoption of open skies policy is 
delayed and the restrictions on the entry of foreign 
aircraft at Subic and Clark field remain. Domestic 
services have gained from deregulation but not 
international services. The 4 firm concentration index 
CR4 for the airline industry shows that it is basically an 
oligopoly with PAL controlling 53% share of the market 
(Manuela, 2007).
7
 A monopoly for more than 20 years, 
liberalization transformed the domestic industry into 
virtual duopolies in major airline markets while minor 
routes remain virtual monopolies, suggesting that the 
government’s goal to make the industry more 
competitive has not been realized. Our calculations
8
 
also reveal that CR4 for transport (broad category for 
airlines) remains high within the otherwise competitive 
services sector.  
3.6. Four Firm Concentration Ratios for the 
Philippine Economy (2002-08) 
Using the data provided by NSO, Philippines, at the 
AIM Policy Center we calculated the four firm 
concentration ratios (CR4) for all the 3 sectors 
agriculture, industry and services in the Philippines 
updated till 2008. CR4 is used as one of the measures 
of judging the competitiveness of the economy; Price 
Cost Margins and Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index being 
the other such measures. CR4 measures the 
percentage of sales of the four largest firms in the 
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Since 2007, there have been many significant changes in the airline industry. 
From 2007 to 2011, domestic passenger traffic increased by 80% while 
international passenger traffic (in local carriers) rose by 57%. Market shares 
also changed markedly. Cebu Pacific has the biggest share in domestic travel 
in 2011 with 45% while PAL has 23%. PAL retained its lead, though, in 
international travel with 56% share against Cebu Pacific’s 35%. (Source: Civil 
Aeronautics Board, http://www.cab.gov.ph/statistics/item/scheduled-domestic-
passenger-traffic-statistics-2006-1st-quarter-2012-as-of-may-11-
2012?category_id=77 and http://www.cab.gov.ph/statistics/item/scheduled-
international-passenger-traffic-2004-1st-qtr-2012-as-of-may-9-
2012?category_id=78). 
8
See Annex Table B. 
 
Figure 8: Trade Openness in the Philippines (constant 2000 US$). 
Source: World Development Indicators Online. 
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market divided by the total market sales. The larger the 
ratio, the less competition there is in the market; the 
smaller the ratio, the more competitive the market is. 
More specifically, a ratio of less than 40% is considered 
competitive; a ratio of more than 40% is considered an 
oligopoly. 
The decade of the 1980s through to the 1990s 
revealed a high degree of concentration in Philippine 
manufacturing industry (Aldaba, 2000). For all 
manufacturing top 4 firms accounted for 81% of all 
output. 90% of manufacturing industry had 
concentration ratios ranging from 70-100%.
9
 
Manufacturing subsectors that displayed a high level of 
concentration were those that produce intermediate 
and capital goods. The ‘price-cost margins’ were also 
at 34% in 1998, considered as high (Aldaba, 2008). As 
of 2009, the manufacturing sector accounts only for 
21% of GDP and less than 10% of employment. From 
the simultaneous presence of high concentration in 
industry and poor economic performance it is possible 
that concentration has stifled growth in manufacturing 
in the Philippines. One of the reasons cited for 
concentration is there is a “missing middle” (medium 
scale industries).
10
 Therefore enterprises that have the 
scale gain oligopolistic powers in the market. 
Broadly, concentration is divided in the following 
manner:  
Table 9: Concentration Ratios 
Level Ratio 
0 – 40 Low Concentration (Highly competitive) 
40 – 70 Medium Concentration (Oligopolistic) 
70 – 100 High Concentration (Monopolistic) 
Source: Aldaba (2008). 
 
Data from the industrial sector indicates that the top 
4 firms control 57% of the revenues overall. This 
indicates medium level of concentration. Further if we 
take a look at the manufacturing sector we find an 
overall concentration of 59%. Comparing with the figure 
from 1998 which had a manufacturing concentration of 
81%, we find a fairly dramatic improvement in the 2008 
level of concentration. That this is not reflected in the 
performance of the manufacturing sector gives us 
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See Annex, Table A. 
10
Medium Scale enterprises are not present in many areas of production 
(Aldaba, 2007). 
reason to study the sector closely and unravel some of 
the other underlying factors behind poor performance.  
There has been substantial movement in the above 
table since the 1990s. Plastics manufacturing has 
moved from highly concentrated to low concentration 
and rubber manufacturing and glass manufacturing has 
transitioned from high to moderate concentration 
among others.
11
 Among the highly concentrated 
industries in 2008 we still have petrol, tobacco (97%), 
air and space craft (99%), basic, precious and non-
ferrous metals (96%), electricity distribution and control 
apparatus (93%), repair and building of ships (90%), 
motor vehicles manufacturing, coconut oil, copra and 
related products (86%) and household appliances 
among others. Moderate concentration is still observed 
in dairy (69%), publishing (68%), semiconductors 
(60%), cement (55%), sugar (45%) and textiles (44%). 
Among the low concentration industries there is paper 
(31%), wood (30%), footwear, plastic (18%), rice and 
corn milling. 
It can be clearly observed from Figure 10 that 
overall level of concentration is now in the moderate 
range across the entire manufacturing sector. Over the 
decade of the 90s the manufacturing concentration 
ratio ranged between 70.88% and 80.55%. From 
Figure 10 and Table 10 below it can be seen that the 4 
firm concentration ratio from 2002 onwards is in the 
range of 60%. Therefore we can conclude that 
manufacturing concentration over time has reduced 
and that policies pursued in the last 2 decades are 
gradually increasing the level of competition in the 
economy. Observing some sub sectors up close, food 
industry, basic metals, radio, TV and commercial 
apparatus, motor vehicles are all less concentrated 
relative to the earlier levels in the 90s. However even 
after 2 decades of liberalization policies, most 
industries hover around 60% concentration, indicative 
of an oligopolistic structure. The refined petroleum 
industry is 99% concentrated. In general manufacturing 
industry is already open with low tariff rates and 
removal of constraints to foreign investment in the 
industry, however in reality oligopoly exists. This may 
help explain the small share that manufacturing has in 
the GDP. 
The industrial sector has seen an average growth 
rate of 2.34% over 1981-2010. Since the reforms were 
initiated in the mid 80s the average growth rate has 
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See Annex, Table B. 
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been 3.32%. The success of the liberalization policy if 
any may be seen in the changing composition of 
concentration as pointed out above. 
Over the past decade the least concentrated sector 
is the services sector. With concentration ratios ranging 
between 0.27 and 0.34, we can conclude that this 
sector is very competitive in nature. Looking at the 
growth in this industry over the last few years 
especially in the BPO sector, we may be able to 
conclude that less concentration, leading to higher 
competitiveness may have been one of the reasons the 
BPO sector posted high growth rates. The services 
sector in the Philippines, accounts for 54% of the GDP 
and employs about 49% of the labor force. The growth 
of the services sector has accelerated since the mid-
1990s when the Philippines started enjoying high 
remittance inflows (12% of GDP in 2008) and service 
exports mainly through the BPO industry (3.2% of 
GDP). 
Within the services sub sectors, transport, storage 
and communication (which includes the airline industry) 
is highly concentrated with 81% of output controlled by 
the top 4 firms. This is followed by community, social 
and personal services at 54%. Least concentrated is 
the hotels and restaurants business at 10%. The BPO 
sector falls in the category of real estate renting and 
other business activities. This enjoys the benefits of a 
highly competitive market with concentration at 23%.
12
 
From a total investment project cost of Php 2 billion in 
2000, the country’s BPO industry rose to more than 
PhP11 billion in 2010. The government fully supports 
the outsourcing industry; laws and policies intended to 
attract foreign investors to put up their business in the 
country have been enacted. The collaboration between 
the government and the private sector for the benefit of 
the industry is evidenced by actions such as in 2001, 
the government formed the Information Technology 
and E-Commerce Council (ITTEC) which is tasked to 
provide direction on information and communication 
technology and develop the country as an E-services 
hub (Nejar, 2010). In order to encourage setting up of 
outsourcing units in the country, the government has 
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See Annex, Table B. 
Table 10: Four Firm Concentration Ratios for the Philippines across Sectors 2002-08 
Concentration Ratio Number of Establishments 
Sector 2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 
Agriculture 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.47 326 349 102 109 
Industrial 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.57 765 645 365 347 
Services 0.27 0.29 0.40 0.34 1342 1270 326 410 
Source: Industry Statistics Division, NSO, 2012; Computations by the staff of the AIM Policy Center. 
 
 
Figure 9: Four Firm Concentration Ratios by Major Sector for the Philippines. 
Source: Industry Statistics Division, NSO (2012); Computations by the staff of the AIM Policy Center. 
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extended an array of incentives, both fiscal and non-
fiscal.
13 
Although agricultural output remains volatile and 
subject to climatic shocks, the sector has tremendous 
importance in the Philippines as the employer of the 
last resort, accounting for 37% of jobs in the economy. 
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The following are the investment laws that grant incentives to BPO activities:  
• Executive Order (EO) No. 226, as amended – known as the 
Omnibus Investments Code (OIC) of the Philippines is being implemented by 
the Board of Investments (BOI);  
• Republic Act (RA) No. 7916, as amended – known as the Special 
Economic Zone Act or the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Law; 
and  
• Others such as RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development 
Act of 1992), as amended by RA No. 9400; RA No. 7903 (Zamboanga City 
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995); and RA No. 7922 (Cagayan Special 
Economic Zone Act of 1995).  
The PEZA extends incentives to companies setting up operation within the 
PEZA administered zones while the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) 
and Clark Development Corporation administer the economic zones (Subic 
Bay Freeport Zone and Clark Freeport Zone) established by the conversion of 
the former United States military base in Subic and Clark, respectively (Nejar, 
2010). 
The agricultural sector has grown by 4% average rate 
over the last decade. The economy has moved away 
from agriculture to a services based economy, however 
the competitiveness of the agricultural sector when 
examined reveals that it has a concentration ratio of 
0.47. This places it just above the level of competitive 
markets displaying a tendency towards oligopoly. 
Cross-country comparisons of prices of various key 
agricultural commodities reveal the Philippines’ 
challenges in agricultural competitiveness.  
3.7. Overall Assessment of Policy and Reform 
Initiatives in the Philippines 
In spite of a temporary reversal during the East 
Asian crisis in 1999, liberalization proceeded in line 
with the Philippines’ commitments under the ASEAN 
free trade agreement (AFTA). However, after a partial 
reversal of tariff reductions in late 2003, new initiatives 
have been lacking. With a Tariff Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (TTRI) as calculated by the World Bank for 
 
Figure 10: Concentration Ratios in Philippines Manufacturing Sub-Sectors 2002-08. 
Source: Industry Statistics Division, NSO, 2012; Computations by the staff of the AIM Policy Center. 
 
 
Figure 11: Growth Rate of Philippine Industrial Sector 1981-2010. 
Source: NSCB, Philippines. 
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overall trade of 3.8 percent, the Philippines remains a 
relatively open economy, and compares well to the 
average East Asian and Pacific (EAP) and lower-
middle-income countries (with TTRIs of 4.9 and 8.4, 
respectively)
14
. The trade regime is more protective of 
imports of agricultural goods, which have a barrier 
three times higher than that for non-agricultural goods 
(World Bank). Nevertheless, the Philippines lacks a 
comprehensive competition policy as pointed out in 
Table 6; but has a variety of laws that are implemented 
by various government authorities. This has created 
ambiguity and loopholes whereby oligopolistic and 
monopolistic practices flourish somewhat unchecked.  
 
Figure 13: Growth Rate of Agriculture Sector, 1981-2010. 
Source: NSCB (2012). 
4. SYNTHESIS 
Based on a brief review of the empirical literature 
and a synthesis of the experiences of South Korea, 
China, India, Philippines and Indonesia, it is clear that 
there is a delicate balancing act between policies to 
attain the advantages of industrial concentration and 
those that foster market competition. Different 
countries’ economic development trajectories affect, 
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Based on World Bank Trade Indicators 2009-2010 
(http://go.worldbank.org/7F01C2NTP0). 
and are in turn affected, by this balancing act. This 
paper finds that the adoption and implementation of 
competition policies and laws vary in their timing, 
consistency and elements across countries. Their 
successful implementation critically depends on their 
coherence with other industrial policies. At times, the 
tensions across industrial policies adopted under a 
government-led economy, protectionist tendencies, 
social welfare considerations and competition policies 
provide challenges to the adoption or implementation of 
competition law. Indeed, some view the lax 
implementation of competition policies as part and 
parcel of some countries’ industrial policies (Pangestu, 
2002). 
Further, interest groups that benefit from initial 
industrial support policies will typically resist the 
introduction of competition-minded laws and policies 
(e.g., reduction of protection, abolition of subsidies, 
policies to de-concentrate and liberalize industries). It is 
not uncommon for economic crises to bring issues to a 
head, by exposing the weaknesses of lack of 
competition, and triggering the appropriate reforms. 
What is clear is that there is no clear path as regards 
the transition from a state-led system to a market-
oriented economy characterized by the effective 
regulation and facilitation of free market competition. 
Nevertheless, factors such as increased economic 
openness, and linked to this, the risks of crisis 
vulnerability, appear to play a key role in triggering the 
necessary reforms. Public perceptions of fairness and 
consumer protection—in turn translating into political 
pressure—have also figured in some countries’ efforts 
to strengthen competition policy. Economic openness 
does not substitute for coherent and effective 
competition policy and laws. Instead, further openness 
and integration necessitates a more sophisticated 
balancing of industrial concentration tendencies and 
market competition. 
 
Figure 12: Growth Rate of Philippines Services Sector from 1981 to 2010. 
Source: NSCB, Philippines. 
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ANNEX 
Table A: Four-firm Concentration Ratios in the Philippine Manufacturing Industry (1988-1998) 
Concentration ratios Number of establishments Sector 
1988 1994 1995 1998 1988 1994 1995 1998 
High (above 70%)  
Petroleum Refineries  100  100  100  99.93  4  4  4  5  
Professional and Scientific  100  100  99.97  97.41  14  13  20  80  
Tobacco  96.64  99.56  99.41  99.50  25  21  22  21  
Nonferrous Metal Products  99.67  99.28  98.57  97.76  35  34  40  35  
Glass and Glass Products  96.33  90.58  92.05  95.43  35  53  46  66  
Industrial Chemicals  90.14  87.52  84.65  86.49  112  171  197  375  
Transport Equipment  80.98  86.2  84.4  77.67  230  264  265  364  
Pottery, China and Earthen  92.82  86.05  93.74  d  59  68  61  - 
Food Processing  79.51  81.37  81.74  a  915  751  717  - 
Iron and Steel  84.18  80.64  70.55  79.43  128  191  201  505  
Machinery except Electrical  63.59  77.47  79.43  94.90  556  464  460  888  
Petroleum and Coal Products  81.1  77.0  87.4  100  16  14  16  13  
Fabricated Metal Products  73.45  74.48  74.32  78.24  469  555  550  975  
Other Chemicals  66.37  75.64  69.09  80.92  300  288  295  397  
Rubber Products  79.15  73.5  73.66  90.33  137  187  181  136  
Other Nonmetallic Mineral  68.92  71.31  74.54  90.03 d  353  304  253  701  
Paper and Paper Products  78.97  71.23  70.4  78.14  167  215  206  335  
Miscellaneous Manufacture  70.87  70.62  76.76  92.77  342  312  309  310  
Textiles  64.12  64.14  72.37  72.84  549  537  508  586  
Food Manufacturing  63.48  69.74  77.92  86.94a  2003  1879  1798  3919  
Beverages  48.19  70.08  63.43  73.51  91  86  88  129  
Electrical Machinery  64.8  69.36  63.73  72.42  217  271  310  448  
Leather and Leather Products  57.7  63.89  64.02  73.47 c  120  84  85  595  
Wood and Cork Products  40.5  55.47  65.35  76.32  683  401  354  584  
Printing and Publishing  42.13  47.26  51.08  82.08  636  637  636  988  
Plastic Products  49.41  40.75  50.87  70.09  300  377  365  490  
Moderate (40 to 69%)  
Metal Furniture  80.88  79.49  62.67  b  36  34  35  - 
Cement  45.3  48.3  45.37  68.22  17  18  18  20  
Leather Footwear  30.33  41.7  55.0  c  425  384  373  - 
Furniture  19.51  40.91  41.64  62.54 b  678  497  439  68  
Low (below 39%)  
Wearing Apparel ex Footwear  34.7  31.69  26.52  23.57  1556  1512  1521  2025  
Total Manufacturing  70.88  73.63  73.64  80.55  11208  10726  10373  15674  
Source: (Aldaba, 2000). 
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Table B: Four Firm Concentration Ratios for Manufacturing Industry Sub Sectors 2002 – 2008 
Concentration Ratio Establishments Sector 
2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 
Manufacturing 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.59 711 574 306 295 
High (>0.7) 
Manufacture of embroidered fabrics 1.00 0.90 0.95 0.65 65 7 4 4 
Manufacture of other office, accounting and computing 
machinery, n.e.c. 
1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 3 5 4 4 
Manufacture of watches and clocks 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3 7 4 4 
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 6 3 4 4 
Manufacture of tobacco products 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes 0.93 1.00 0.98 1.00 6 6 4 2 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 4 6 4 4 
Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap 0.92 0.63 0.88 0.57 8 4 5 4 
Manufacture of transport equipment, n.e.c. 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.91 4 4 4 4 
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 4 6 4 4 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.70 4 5 4 4 
Production of crude coconut oil, copra cake, meals and 
pellets 
0.86 0.68 0.79 0.82 4 4 4 4 
Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage and 
handbags 
0.85 0.79 0.87 0.91 8 5 4 4 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.88 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of computers, computer peripherals equipment 
and accessories 
0.82 0.79 0.61 0.78 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of household appliances, n.e.c. 0.72 0.83 0.86 0.86 5 6 4 4 
Moderate (0.4 to below 0.7) 
Manufacture of dairy products 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.58 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 
and electric generating sets 
0.69 0.81 0.60 0.68 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 0.68 0.51 0.58 0.68 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments and 
appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and 
other purposes, except optical 
0.68 0.85 0.72 0.51 5 5 4 4 
Publishing 0.68 0.60 0.61 0.56 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters, receivers, 
sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus, and 
associated goods 
0.64 0.75 0.74 0.83 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of semi-conductor devices and other electronic 
components 
0.60 0.62 0.62 0.52 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of products of bamboo, cane, rattan, and the 
like, and plaiting materials except furniture, manufacture of 
other products of wood 
0.56 0.52 0.53 0.51 16 8 4 4 
Manufacture of cement 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.48 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of rubber products 0.54 0.61 0.67 0.70 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of glass and glass products 0.53 0.63 0.69 0.68 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of other food products 0.53 0.58 0.50 0.32 4 7 4 4 
Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.46 0.32 0.39 0.46 5 4 4 4 
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(Table B). Continued. 
Concentration Ratio Establishments Sector 
2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 
Manufacture of sugar 0.45 0.55 0.58 0.57 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines 
0.45 0.40 0.35 0.37 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of other textiles 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.37 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, metal 
working service activities 
0.41 0.23 0.27 0.27 9 5 4 4 
Low (below 0.4) 
Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 0.36 0.49 0.61 0.41 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of beverages 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.25 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles, 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
0.34 0.71 0.80 0.62 22 6 4 4 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of wood, and wood products, except furniture 0.30 0.54 0.68 0.72 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of footwear 0.29 0.27 0.37 0.35 4 5 4 4 
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.38 4 4 4 4 
Production processing and preservation of meat, fish and 
other seafoods, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats, including 
slaughtering and meat packing 
0.24 0.35 0.27 0.31 4 5 4 4 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel 0.19 0.28 0.35 0.32 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture of plastic products 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.11 4 4 4 4 
Manufacture and repair of furniture 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.23 4 4 4 4 
Rice/corn milling 0.12 0.14 0.44 0.28 14 8 4 4 
Ready-made garments manufacturing 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.17 4 4 4 4 
Rebuilding or repairing of various kinds of machinery and 
equipment and associated parts/accessories 
0.09 0.12 0.82 0.47 15 8 4 4 
Source of Data: Industry Statistics Division, National Statistics Office. The concentration ratios refer to the ratio of combined revenues of four largest firms to total 
each major PSIC sector, AIM Policy Center Calculations, 2012. 
 
Table C: Concentration within the Services Sub-Sectors 
Establishments Concentration ratio Proportion of employment Sector 
2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, 
motorcycles and 
personal and 
household goods 
595 842 101 133 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.22 1.2 1.8 6.2 3.8 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
9 8 8 9 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.9 6.6 2.5 3.7 
Transport, storage 
and communications 
74 151 63 62 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.81 26.9 24.8 33.4 38.0 
Financial 
intermediation 
32 32 29 46 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.41 16.2 16.9 22.1 24.2 
Real estate, renting 
and business 
activities 
423 161 72 104 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.23 9.5 6.7 10.7 8.8 
Education 28 31 20 20 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16 4.6 4.0 5.6 7.1 
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(Table C). Continued. 
Establishments Concentration ratio Proportion of employment Sector 
2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 2003 2005 2006 2008 
Health and social 
work 
158 14 12 12 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.25 6.8 5.3 10.6 13.0 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
23 31 21 24 0.48 0.50 0.59 0.54 6.6 6.4 25.5 21.7 
Source of Data: Industry Statistics Division, National Statistics Office. The concentration ratios refer to the ratio of combined revenues of four largest firms to total 
each major PSIC sector. 
+AMDG. 
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